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Abstract  
We would like to prevent, detect, and protect communication and 
information systems' attacks, which include unauthorized reading of a 
message of file and traffic analysis or active attacks, such as modification 
of messages or files, and denial of service by providing cryptographic 
techniques. If we prove that an encryption algorithm is based on 
mathematical NP-hard problems, we can prove its security. In this paper, 
we present a new NTRU-Like public-key cryptosystem with security 
provably based on the worst-case hardness of the approximate lattice 
problems (NP-hard problems) in some structured lattices (ideal lattices) in 
order to attain the applicable objectives of preserving the confidentiality 
of communication and information system resources (includes hardware, 
software, firmware, information/data, and telecommunications). Our 
proposed scheme is an improvement of ETRU cryptosystem. ETRU is an 
NTRU-Like public-key cryptosystem based on the Eisenstein integers 
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where is a primitive cube root of unity. ETRU has heuristic security and it 
has no proof of security. We show that our cryptosystem has security 
stronger than that of ETRU, over Cartesian product of Dedekind domains 
and extended cyclotomic polynomials. We prove the security for our main 
algorithm from the R-SIS and R-LWE problems as NP-hard problems. 
Keywords: Lattice-based cryptography; Ideal lattices; ETRU; Provable 
security; Dedekind domain. 
2010 subject classification: 94A60; 11T71; 14G50; 68P25. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Public-key cryptography has many exciting applications for web browsers, 
e-mail programs, cell phones, bank cards, RFID tags, smart cards, government 
communications, banking systems, and so on. The users to communicate over 
non-secure channels without any prior communication can use public-key 
cryptography. The idea of public-key cryptography was first proposed by Diffie 
and Hellman in 1976 [1]. Lattice-based cryptography as a field of public-key 
cryptography has attracted considerable interest and it has been categorized into 
post-quantum cryptography [6]. Lattice-based cryptography enjoys efficient 
implementations, very strong security proofs based on worst-case hardness, as 
well as great simplicity. Our focus here will be mainly on the theoretical aspects 
of lattice-based cryptography. 
The NTRU cryptosystem which is a famous lattice-based crypto scheme 
devised by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman, was first presented at the Crypto’96 
rump session [2]. Although its structure relies on arithmetic over the quotient 
polynomial ring [ ]/ 1
N
q
x x − Z  for N prime and q a small integer, it was quickly 
shown that breaking it could be reflected as a problem over Euclidean lattices 
[3]. At the ANTS’98 conference, the NTRU authors presented an improved 
variant including a thorough assessment of its practical security against lattice 
attacks [4]. The NTRU cryptosystem standard number and version is IEEE 
P1363.1 [5]. The NTRU encryption (NTRUEncrypt) system is also often 
considered as the most practical post-quantum public-key crypto scheme [6] and 
this scheme uses the properties of structured lattices to achieve high efficiency 
but its security remains heuristic and it was an important open challenge to 
provide a provably secure scheme with comparable efficiency. For example, an 
8-dimensional lattice in 2D view is shown in Figure 1. 
By rising number of attacks and practical variants of NTRU, provable 
security in lattice-based cryptography is developed. The first provably secure 
lattice-based cryptosystem and its variant of GapSVP in arbitrary lattices were 
presented by Ajtai and Dwork [8, 9]. Ajtai’s average-case problem is now 
reflected to as the Small Integer Solution problem (SIS). Another major 
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achievement in this field was the introduction in 2005 of the Learning with 
Errors problem (LWE) by Regev [13]. Micciancio [10] presented an alternative 
based on the worst-case hardness of the restriction of Poly(n)-SVP to cyclic 
lattices and succeeded in restricting SIS to structured matrices while preserving 
a worst-case to average-case reduction, which correspond to ideals in 
polynomial ring [ ]/ 1nx x − Z . Subsequently, Lyubashevsky and Micciancio 
[11] and independently Peikert and Rosen [12] showed how to modify 
Micciancio's function to construct an efficient and provably secure collision 
resistant hash function. So, they introduced the more general class of ideal 
lattices, which correspond to ideals in polynomial rings [ ]/
q
x   Z  with a   
that is irreducible cyclotomic polynomial, also is  sparse (e.g., 1
n
x = +  for n 
a power of 2). Their system relies on the hardness of the restriction of Poly(n)-
SVP to ideal lattices (called Poly(n)-Ideal-SVP). The average-case collision-
finding problem is a natural computational problem called Ideal-SIS, which has 
been reflected to be as hard as the worst-case instances of Ideal-SVP.  In 2011, 
Stehlé and Steinfeld [14] proposed a structured variant of the NTRU, which they 
proved as hard as CPA security from the hardness of a variant of R-SIS and R-
LWE (Ring Learning with Errors problem). R-LWE has great efficiency and 
provides more natural and flexible cryptographic constructions. The current 
paper was motivated by [14], in which the integers were replaced with the ring 
of Cartesian product of Eisenstein integers. 
 
 
Figure 1. An 8-dimensional lattice in 2D view. 
 
The ETRU is obtained from the NTRU by replacing Z  with the ring of 
Eisenstein integers [7]. It is faster and has smaller size of keys for the same or 
better level of security than that of NTRU. Both division algorithm for 
Eisenstein integers and the choice of lattice embedding are integral, thus 
significantly improving their efficiency over the complex-valued versions 
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proposed in [15]. Note that the ETRU security is based on both SVP and then 
CVP so its security remains heuristic. The other author's lattice-based schemes 
are [20 – 28] which are suitable for application to WSNs and IoT [29-31]. 
In this paper, our proposed cryptosystem based on extended ideal lattices 
over 
3 3
: ( [ ] [ ])[ ]/R xz z= ´ < F >Z Z  (for 1(1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1) ... (1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1)nnx x x− = + + + +   
with n+1 a prime) exploits the properties of the ETRU structured lattice to 
achieve high efficiency and it has IND-CPA security based on ideal lattices with 
established hardness of R-SIS and R-LWE problems. We prove that our 
modification of ETRU is provably secure, assuming the quantum hardness of 
standard worst-case problems over extended ideal lattices. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we shortly review 
the ETRU system and explain the security related to the computational 
problems. In section 3, we study ideal lattices, R-SIS and R-LWE problems. In 
section 4, we suggest a key generation algorithm, where the generated public 
key follows a distribution for which Ideal-SVP reduces to R-LWE. In section 5, 
we make our modified ETRU cryptosystem as secure as worst-case problems 
over ideal lattices. Finally, the paper concludes in section 6. 
 
 
2. ETRU Cryptosystem 
 
2.1. Parameters Creation 
We denote by 
3  a complex cube root of unity, that is 
3
3
1 =  where 
3 31 / 2( 1 )i = − +  since 
3
3
2
3 331 ( 1)( 1) 0   − = − + + = , we have 
2
3 3
1 0 + + =  
and hence 2
3 3
1 = − − . The ring of Eisenstein integers, denoted 
3[ ]Z , is the set 
of complex numbers of the form 
3a b = +  with ,a bZ . For 3a b = +  we will 
define 22( )d a b ab = = + −  which is the square of the usual analytic complex 
norm | | . Note that ( )d   is a positive integer for 0   since ( )d   is the square 
of a norm and ,a bZ . For any complex numbers ,   we have that | | | | . | |  =  
hence it follows that ( ) ( ). ( )d d d  = . The Eisenstein integers 
3[ ]Z  form a 
lattice in  generated by the basis 
3{1, }B = . Note that the two basis vectors 1 
and 
3 , represented by the vectors (1, 0) and ( 1 / 2, 3 / 2)−  in 
2, have 120 
degrees with equal length. Let   be an Eisenstein integer. We define the ideal 
3( ) { }| ,L a b a b  = + Z . Therefore ( )L   is a lattice generated by the basis 
3{ , }  . According to [7], we deduce that the Eisenstein integers are an 
Euclidean domain that the units and Eisenstein primes exist. For each matrix B 
with entries that are Eisenstein integers we will set < B > to be the 2n by 2n 
matrix. We choose an prime n and set 3[ 1, ]/
n
R x x= − Z , we also choose p 
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and q in 
3[ ]Z  relatively prime, with |q| much larger than |p|. Since each ETRU 
coefficient is a pair of integers, an element of ETRU at degree n is comparable 
with an element of NTRU of degree n' = 2n. 
 
2.2. Key Generation 
Private key consists of two randomly chosen polynomials f, g in R. We 
define the inverses Fq = f -1 in Rq and Fp = f -1 in Rp. Hence public key is 
generated by h = Fq * g. The public key h is a polynomial with n coefficients 
which are reduced modulo q. Each coefficient consists of two integers which by 
Theorem 3 in [7] can be stored as binary strings of length 
2
log (4 | | /3)q   , hence 
the size of the ETRU public key is 
2
2 log (4 | | /3)K n q=    . An NTRU public key, 
corresponding to polynomials with n' = 2n coefficients reduced modulo an 
integer q', has size 
2
' ' log ( ')K n q=    . Therefore to maintain the same key size as 
NTRU with n' = 2n and q' = 2k , we should choose | | (3 / 4) 'q q  so that 
2 2
log (4 | | /3) log ( ')q q       . 
 
2.3. Encryption 
Each encryption requires the user to compute *  mod  e ph m q= +  where m 
is a plaintext and   is a ephemeral key. In total one counts 
22
' ' ~ 4 2n n n n+ +  
operations for NTRU encryption at ' ~ 2n n  in contrast to only 
2
3 27n n+  
operations for ETRU encryption. 
 
2.4. Decryption 
Each decryption requires the user to compute both *   mod  a f e q=  and 
*   mod  pm F a p= . For decryption, we have 
22
2 ' 2 ' ~ 8 4n n n n++  operations for 
NTRU and only 
2
6 29n n+  operations for ETRU. 
 
2.5. Decryption Failure and Security 
In [7] is shown that in fact | |~ (3 / 8) 'q q  is an optimal choice in view of 
security against decryption failure and lattice attacks. Based on this choice the 
public key size for ETRU will be smaller than that of the NTRU public key. 
 
 
3. Ideal Lattices and Their Hard Problems 
Our results are restricted to the sequence of rings
3 3
: ( [ ] [ ])[ ]/R xz z= ´ < F >Z Z  
with 1(1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1) ... (1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1)nnx x x− = + + + + where n+1 is a prime 
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that is irreducible cyclotomic polynomial. We can refer to [19] for 
irreducibility of cyclotomic polynomials 
n
F in 
3
[ ][ ]xzZ  where n is prime in 
3
[ ]zZ
The R-LWE problem is known to be hard when   is cyclotomic [16]. The 
security analysis for our proposed scheme  allows encrypting and decrypting 
( )n  plaintext bits for ( )O n  bit operations, while achieving security against 
( )
2
g n
-time attacks, for any g(n) that is (log )n and o(n), assuming the worst-case 
hardness of poly(n)-Ideal-SVP against ( ( ))2O g n -time quantum algorithms for 
each element component-wise in complex pair-wise system because note that 
each polynomial in R has its coefficients of the form 
3 3
(( , ), ( , ))
i i i i
a b c dz z (ai, bi 3 ) 
where , , ,
i i iia b c d Z , so in this paper, all operations execute for ai's, bi's, ci's and 
di's separately, that is,   2 component-wise. The latter assumption is believed 
to be valid for any g(n)=o(n). Also we can define £  and ³  as poset orders. 
 
3.1. Notation 
Similar to [14] we denote by 
1 2 3 4( , , , ) 1 2 3 4
( ), , ,x x x x    (respectively 
1 2 3 4( , , , )   
 ) the standard n-dimensional Gaussian function (respectively 
distribution) with center (0,0,0,0) and variance 
1 2 3 4( ), , ,    . We denote by 
( )Exp  the exponential distribution on 4n with mean  and by U(E) the uniform 
distribution over a finite set E . If D1 and D2 are two distributions on discrete 
oracle E, their statistical distance is 
2 1 21 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4( ; ) 1 / 2 | ( ) ( ) |, , , , , ,
x E
D D D x x x x D x x x x

 = − . We write z D when the 
random variable z is chosen from the distribution D. The integer n is called the 
lattice dimension. Note that in our proposed scheme with pairwise components 
and coefficients in vectors, the dimension increases four times without 
increasing n. The minimum 
1
( )L (respectively 1 ( )L
 ) is the Euclidean 
(respectively infinity) norm of any shortest vector of L \ (0,0,0,0).  
The dual of lattice L is the lattice 
1 2 3 4
4 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
ˆ {( ) }: , ( ), (, , , , , , , , , )
i i i i
n
L c c c c R c c c ci b b b b=    Z  where the bij’s 
are a basis of L. For a lattice L, 
1 2 3 4( ) (0, 0, 0, 0), , ,     and (c1,c2,c3,c4)
4n, 
we define the lattice Gaussian distribution of support L, deviation 
1 2 3 4( ), , ,   
and center (c1,c2,c3,c4) by 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
( , , , ),( , , , ) ( , , , ),( , , , )1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4,( , , , ),( , , , ) 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
( ) ( ) / ( ), , , , , ,
c c c c c c c cL c c c cD b b b b b b b b L            = , for any 
1 2 3 4( ), , ,b b b b L .  
We extend the definition of  
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4,( , , , ),( , , , )L c c c c
D     to any M L
(not necessarily a sub-lattice), by setting 
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1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
( , , , ),( , , , ) ( , , , ),( , , , )1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4,( , , , ),( , , , ) 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
( ) ( ( )) / ( ( )), , , , , ,
c c c c c c c cM c c c cD b b b b b b b b M            =
and for  
1 2 3 4( ) (0, 0, 0, 0), , ,     , we denote the smoothing parameter 1 2 3 4( , , , ) ( )L   
as the smallest 
1 2 3 4( ) (0, 0, 0, 0), , ,     such that  
1 2 3 4(1,1,1,1)/( , , , ) 1 2 3 4
ˆ( \ (0, 0, 0, 0)) ( ), , ,L        .  
It quantifies how large 
1 2 3 4( ), , ,    needs to be for 1 2 4 1 2 3 4,( , , 3, ),( , , , )L c c c cD     to 
behave like a continuous Gaussian. We will typically consider 2 ni
−
= . 
 
3.2. Definition 
Let n+1 be a prime and 1(1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1) ... (1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1)nnx x x− = + + + + 
which is irreducible over
3 3
[ ] [ ]z z´Q Q also let
3 3
: ( [ ] [ ])[ ]/R xz z= ´ < F >Z Z . An 
(integral) ideal I of R is a subset of R closed under addition and multiplication by 
arbitrary elements of R. By mapping polynomials to the vectors of their 
coefficients, we see that an ideal (0, 0, 0, 0)I  corresponds to a full-rank sub-
lattice of 4n. Thus we can view I as both a lattice and an ideal. An ideal lattice 
for   is a sub-lattice of (*)2n that corresponds to a non-zero ideal I R . The 
algebraic norm N(I) is equal to det I, where I is regarded as a lattice. In the 
following, an ideal lattice will implicitly refer to a  -ideal lattice.  
By restricting SVP (respectively  -SVP) to instances that are ideal lattices, 
we obtain Ideal-SVP (respectively  -ideal-SVP). The latter is implicitly 
parameterized by the polynomial
1
(1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1) ... (1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1)
nn
x x x
−
 = + + + +  . No algorithm is known to 
perform non-negligibly better for  -ideal-SVP than for  -SVP [14]. 
 
3.3. Properties of The Ring of Cartesian Product 
For 1 2 3 4( ), , ,v v v v R we define by ||(v1, v2, v3, v4)|| its Euclidean norm. We 
denote the multiplicative expansion factor by 
, 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4( ) max (|| ( ) ( ) ||) / (|| ( ) || . || ( ) ||), , , , , , , , , , , ,u v Ri iR u u u u v v v v u u u u v v v v  =  . 
Since  is the n+1-th cyclotomic polynomial, the ring R is exactly the maximal 
order of the cyclotomic field 3 3( [ ] [ ])[ ]: [ , ']
x
K
z z
z z
´
= @
F
Q Q
Q . We denote by 
1 2 3 4( ), , ,i i i i i n     the complex embeddings. We can choose 
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4( : (    ), , , ) , , ,
i i i i
i i i i K K       
+ + + +
→ for i n . 
Lemma 3.1. The norm of  as an element in 
3( ) is a
2 + b2 - ab. This is 
also 2| | , where  is denoted as an element of  . 
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Proof. The minimal polynomial of 
3 over  is the cyclotomic polynomial 
2
3 1x x = + + . Thus, there exist exactly two monomorphisms (isomorphisms 
in this case) from  to  fixing  and permuting the roots of 
3 . Since 3 has 
two roots
3 and 
2
3 , the embeddings are 3 31( )a b a b  + = +  and 
3
2
2 3( )a b a b  + = + , where ,a b. By definition, the algebraic norm of 
3a b = + is  
2
2
3
1
3
( ) ( ) ( )
          ( )( )
N
a b a b
    
 
=
= + +
 
Note that 
3
2
3 =  and 33 1  = −+ . So we have 
2
2
3 3
3 3
2
2
( ) ( )( )
          ( )
          
N a b a b
a b ab
a b ab
 
  = + +
= + + +
= + −
 
Now we show that 2( ) ( ) | |d N  = = . 
2
3
2
2
2
2 2
2
1 3
2
3
2 2
| |  | |
         | ( ) |
         | |
3
         
2 2
         
b b
a b
i
a b
i
a
b b
a
a b ab
 
− +
= +
= +
= − +
= − +
= + −
  
   
   
 
□ 
In rest of the paper, all of computations are done component-wise for each 
complex element as an integer. We define T2-norm by 
2 2 2 22
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 42 1 2 3 4( ) ( | ( ) | | ( ) | | ( ) | | ( ) |, , , , , , )i i i i
i n i n i n i n
T            
   
=     . We also 
use the fact that for any 1 2 3 4( ), , , R     , we have |N 1 2 3 4( ), , ,    | = det <
1 2 3 4( ), , ,    >, where < 1 2 3 4( ), , ,    > is the ideal of R generated by
1 2 3 4( ), , ,    . Let (q1, q2, q3, q4) be a prime element such that  has n distinct 
linear factors modulo (q1, q2, q3, q4), that is, 
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 1 2 3 4( (( ) ( ))  mod  ( ), , , , , , , , ,
i i i i
i n
x x x x q q q q   

 = −  where i 's are primitive 
n+1-th root of unity modulo (q1, q2, q3, q4) component-wise. Also we know that  
1 2 3 4
( , , , ) 1 2 3 4
/ ( ) / ( ) / ( ) / ( )
q q q q
R R q R R q R R q R R q R= ´ ´ ´ . 
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3.4. Adaptation of Ideal Lattice Problems 
Definition 3.1. The ring small integer solution problem with parameters 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
( , , , ), , ( , , , ),q q q q m b b b b F is: Given m polynomials 
11 21 31 41 1 1 1 1
( , , , ), ..., ( , , , )
m m m m
a a a a a a a a chosen uniformly and independently in 
1 2 3 4( , , , )q q q q
R , find 
1 2 3 4
( , , , )t t t t in assumed R-module such that 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
|| ( , , , ) || ( , , , )t t t t b b b b£ . 
In [14] is shown that R-SIS and R-LWE are dual. For 
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 ( , , , )
( ), , , q q q qs s s s R and 1 2 3 4( ), , ,    some distributions in 1 2 3 4( , , , )q q q qR , we 
have 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4( , , , ),( , , , )s s s s
A     as the distribution obtained by sampling the pair 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4(( ), ( )( ) ( )), , , , , , , , , , , ,a a a a a a a a s s s s e e e e+ with 
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 ( , , , ) 1 2 3 4
(( ), ( )) ( ) ( ), , , , , , , , ,q q q qa a a a e e e e U R      . The Ring Learning With 
Errors problem (R-LWE) was introduced by Lyubashevsky et al.[16] and shown 
hard for specific error distributions  . The error distributions 1 2 3 4( ), , ,    that 
we use are an adaptation of those introduced in [16]. 
Definition 3.2.
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4( , , , ),( , , , )
( )q q q qR LWE    

− : Let 
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 ( , , , )
( ), , ,         
and 
( )1 2 3 41 2 3 4 , , ,
( ) ( ), , ,
q q q q
s s s s U R where 
1 2 3 4( , , , )   
 is a family of distributions. 
Given access to an oracle O that produces samples in 
1 2 3 4
( , , , )1 2 3 4( , , , ) q q q qq q q q
R R
, distinguish whether O outputs samples from 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4( , , , ),( , , , )s s s s
A     or from
1 2 3 4
( , , , )1 2 3 4( , , , )
( )
q q q qq q q qU R R . The distinguishing advantage should be
( )
1 / ( )  ( .  2 )
o n
poly n resp
− over the randomness of the input, the randomness of the 
samples and the internal randomness of the algorithm, component-wise [14]. 
Theorem 1 in [14] indicates that R-LWE is hard, assuming that the worst-
case  -Ideal-SVP cannot be efficiently solved using quantum computers, for 
small  . It was recently improved by Lyubashevsky et al. [18] if the number of 
samples that can be chosen to the oracle O is bounded by a constant (which is 
the case in our application), then the result also holds with simpler errors than 
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 ( , , , )
( ) ( ), , , , , ,e e e e          , and with an even smaller Ideal-SVP 
approximation factor  . This should allow to both simplify the proposed 
scheme and to strengthen its security guarantee. 
 
3.5. Our Proposed Variants of R-LWE 
For
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 ( , , , )
( ), , , q q q qs s s s R and 1 2 3 4( ), , ,    some distributions in
1 2 3 4
( , , , )q q q q
R , 
we denote 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4, , , , , ,( ),( )s s s s
A    
 as the distribution obtained by sampling 
Amir Hassani Karbasi 
 
 
58 
 
 
the pair 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4(( ), ( )( ) ( )), , , , , , , , , , , ,a a a a a a a a s s s s e e e e+ with 
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 ( , , , ) 1 2 3 4
(( ), ( )) ( ) ( ), , , , , , , , ,q q q qa a a a e e e e U R    

  , where 
1 2 3 4( , , , )q q q q
R

is 
the set of invertible elements of 
1 2 3 4( , , , )q q q q
R . This variant is hard and called 
R LWE

++− as [14]. Furthermore, as explained in [18], the nonce 1 2 3 4( , , , )s s s s
can also be sampled from the error distribution without incurring any security 
loss. We call this variant HNFR LWE

++− . According to adaptation of lemmas 7, 8 
and 9 as well as Theorem 2 in [14] the problems R LWE++− and HNFR LWE

++−
are dual to  -Ideal-SVP  and are defined some families of R-modules for I, an 
arbitrary ideal of 
1 2 3 4( , , , )q q q q
R  as a lattice, also short vectors exist in ideal and 
statistical distance (regularity bound) is exactly appropriate and reliable. 
 
 
4. The Proposed Key Generation Algorithm 
We now use the results of the previous section on modular ideal lattice to 
derive a key generation algorithm for the ETRU for each component in vectors, 
where the generated public key follows a distribution for which Ideal-SVP 
reduces to R-LWE. Algorithm 1 is as follows. 
 
 
Input: 
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 ( , , , ) 1 2 3 4
, , , ( ), , , , , , , , ,q q q qn q q q q p p p p R    

  Z R . 
Output: 
1 2 3 4( , , , )
A key pair ( , ) q q q qsk pk R R

  . 
Sample 
1 2 3 4
( , , , ) 'f f f f  from 4
1 2 3 4,( , , , )
nD    Z
; let 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4( , ) ( , ).( , ) ' (1,1,1,1), , , , , ,f f f f p p p p f f f f= + ; if ( 1 2 3 4( , , , )f f f f  mod
1 2 3 4
( , , , )q q q q )
1 2 3 4( , , , )q q q q
R

 , resample. Sample 
1 2 3 4
( , , , )g g g g  from 
4
1 2 3 4,( , , , )
nD    Z
; if (
1 2 3 4
( , , , )g g g g  mod
1 2 3 4
( , , , )q q q q ) 
1 2 3 4( , , , )q q q q
R

 , resample. 
Return secret key sk = 
1 2 3 4
( , , , )f f f f  and public key pk = 
1 2 3 4
( , , , )h h h h  =
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 ( , , , )
( , , , )( , , , ) / ( , , , )
q q q q
p p p p g g g g f f f f R
´
Î . 
 
The following Theorem ensures that for some appropriate choice of 
parameters, the key generation algorithm terminates in expected polynomial 
time. 
Theorem 4.1[Adapted from 14]. Let 8n  and n+1 be a prime such that 
1
(1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1) ... (1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1)
nn
x x x
−
 = + + + +  splits into n linear factors 
modulo prime 1 2 3 4( ) (5,5,5,5), , ,q q q q  component-wise. Let 
A New Provably Secure Cryptosystem Using Dedekind Domain Direct 
Product Approach 
 
 
59 
 
 
1/
ln(2 (1 1 / )) / .
n
i i in n q   + , or an arbitrary (0,1 / 2)i  . Let 1 2 3 4( , ), ,a a a a R and
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 ( , , , )
( , ), , q q q qp p p p R

   
Then 
  
 
component-wise. 
The following Lemma ensures that the generated secret key is small. 
Lemma 4.1[Adapted from 14]. Let 8n   and n+1 be a prime such that 
1
(1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1) ... (1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1)
nn
x x x
−
 = + + + +   splits into n linear factors 
modulo prime 1 2 3 4( ) (8,8,8,8), , ,q q q q n . Let 
1/
2 ln(6 ) / .
n
i in n q  . The secret 
key polynomials
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
( , , , ), ( , , , )f f f f g g g g  returned by the algorithm 1 satisfy, 
with probability 31 2 n− + − : 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4|| ( , ) || (2, 2, 2, 2) || ( , ) || ( )  || ( , ) || ( ) , , , , , , , , , , , ,f f f f n p p p p and g g g g n         . 
If deg
1 2 3 4
( , , , )p p p p (1,1,1,1) , then 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4|| ( , ) || (4, 4, 4, 4) || ( , ) || ( ), , , , , , ,f f f f n p p p p      with probability
3
1 2
n− +
 −  component-wise. 
Theorem 3 in [14] shows that the public key can be uniformly distributed in 
the whole ring and this satisfy cryptographic pseudo randomness for our 
Algorithm 1, which seems necessary for exploiting the established hardness of 
R-LWE (and R-SIS). Now we can construct the proposed cryptosystem over 
ideal lattices with high efficiency and provable security (CPA-secure). 
 
 
5. The Proposed New Cryptosystem 
Using our new results above, we describe our proposed cryptosystem for 
which we can provide a security proof under a worst-case hardness assumption. 
 
5.1. Decryption Failure 
The correctness condition for each pairwise coefficient in the proposed 
cryptosystem is as follows. 
Lemma 5.1 [Adapted from 14]. If 
21.5
( log ) deg(( )) || ( ) || (1,1,1,1)i i i in n p p     (resp. 
20.5
( log ) || ( ) || (1,1,1,1)  deg( ) (1,1,1,1)i i i in n p if p     ) and 
0.5
i iq n  , then the 
decryption algorithm of the proposed cryptosystem recovers 
1 2 3 4
( , , , )M M M M  
with probability 
(1)
1 n
−
−  over the choice of si, ei, fi and gi component-wise. 
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Proof. In the decryption algorithm, we have 
 
  
and let  
 
 
 computed in R (not modulo
1 2 3 4
( , , , )q q q q ). If 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4|| ( , )" || ( ) / 2, , , , ,C C C C q q q q  then we have 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4( , ) ' ( , )", , , ,C C C C C C C C=  in R and hence, since 
( ) (1,1,1,1) mod ( ), ( ) ' mod  ( ) ( )" mod  ( ) ( )  mod  ( )i i i i i i i if p C p C p M p = = , i.e., the 
decryption algorithm succeeds. It thus suffices to give an upper bound on the 
probability that 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4|| ( , )" || ( ) / 2, , , , ,C C C C q q q q . From Lemma 2, we know 
that with probability 31 2 n− + −  both 
1 2 3 4
( , , , )f f f f  and 
1 2 3 4
( , , , )g g g g  have 
Euclidean norms 2 || ( ) || ( . (4, 4, 4, 4) || ( ) ||   deg( ) (1,1,1,1))i i i i in p resp n p if p    this 
implies that, 2 21.5|| ( )( ) ||, || ( )( ) || (2, 2, 2, 2) || ( ) || ( . (8,8, 8,8) || ( ) || )ni i i i i i i ip f p g n p resp p   
with probability 31 2 n− + − . From Lemma 6 in [14], both 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
( , , , )( , , , )( , , , )p p p p f f f f e e e e  and 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
( , , , )( , , , )( , , , )p p p p g g g g s s s s  
have infinity norm 
 (resp. 21.5(2, 2, 2, 2) (log ). || ( ) ||i i i iq n n p    
2
(8,8,8,8) (log ). || ( ) ||i i i iq n n p  
), with probability 
(1)
1 n
−
− . Independently: 
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Proposed Encryption Scheme 
Parameters Creation: 
1. We use 
1
(1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1) ... (1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1)
nn
x x x
−
 = + + + +   with 8n   
and n+1 a prime, 
3 3
: ( [ ] [ ])[ ]/R xz z= ´ < F >Z Z  and 
1 2 3 4( , , , ) 1 2 3 4
/ ( ) / ( ) / ( ) / ( )q q q qR R q R R q R R q R R q R=    with 
1 2 3 4( ) (5,5,5,5), , ,q q q q   prime such that 
1
n
k
k

=
 = in 
1 2 3 4( , , , )q q q q
R  with distinct 
k 's component-wise. 
Key Generation: 
2. We use the algorithm 1 and return 
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 ( , , , )
( , ), , q q q qsk f f f f R

=  with 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4( , ) (1,1,1,1) mod ( , ), , , ,f f f f p p p p , and pk = 1 2 3 4( , , , )h h h h  =
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 ( , , , )
( , , , )( , , , ) / ( , , , )
q q q q
p p p p g g g g f f f f R
´
Î , component-wise. 
Encryption: 
3. Given message 1 2 3 4( , ), ,M M M M P , set 
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 ( , , , )
( ), ( ), , , , , ,s s s s e e e e      and return ciphertext 
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 ( , , , )
( , ) ( , )( ) ( , )( ) ( , ), , , , , , , , , , , , , , q q q qC C C C h h h h s s s s p p p p e e e e M M M M R= + +   
Decryption: 
4. Given ciphertext 
1 2 3 4
( , , , )C C C C  and secret key 
1 2 3 4
( , , , )f f f f , compute 
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 ( , , , )
( , ) ' ( , ).( , ), , , , , , q q q qC C C C f f f f C C C C R=   and return 
1 2 3 4
( , , , ) 'C C C C  mod 
1 2 3 4
( , , , )p p p p . 
 
 
2 2
|| ( )( ) || || ( )( ) || || ( ) || . || ( ) || (2, 2, 2, 2).(deg( ) (1,1,1,1). || ( ) ||i i i i i i i i inf M f M f M p n p    +  
(resp. 2(8,8,8,8) || ( ) ||i in p  ). Since i iq n  , we conclude that 
1.5 2
|| ( )" || ((6, 6, 6, 6) (2, 2, 2, 2) deg( )). (log ). || ( ) ||i i i i i iC p q n n p   +           (resp. 
20.5
(24, 24, 24, 24) (log ). || ( ) ||i i i iq n n p   ), with probability 
(1)
1 n
−
− , 
component-wise.                                               
        □ 
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5.2. Security 
The security of the proposed cryptosystem follows by an elementary 
reduction from the decisional HNFR LWE

++− , exploiting the uniformity of the 
public key in 
1 2 3 4( , , , )q q q q
R

(adaptation of Theorem 3 in [14]), and the invertibility 
of 
1 2 3 4
( , , , )p p p p  in 
1 2 3 4( , , , )q q q q
R . 
Lemma 5.2 [adapted from 7]. Suppose n+1 is a prime such that 
1
(1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1) ... (1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1)
nn
x x x
−
 = + + + +  splits into n linear factors 
modulo prime (1)iq = . Let 
(1/2,1/2,1/2,1/2)
(2, 2, 2, 2) ln(8 ). ii i in nq q


+
  and 
1 2 3 41 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 ( , , , )
( ), ( ) (0, 0, 0, 0), ( ), , , , , , , , , q q q qp p p p R       

  . If there exists 
an IND-CPA attack against the proposed cryptosystem that runs in time T and 
has success probability (1 / 2,1 / 2,1 / 2,1 / 2) i+  with parameters  i and qi, then 
there exists an algorithm solving HNFR LWE

++−  that runs in time T'  = T + O(n) 
and has success probability ( )' ni i iq 
−
= − . 
Proof. Let A denote the given IND-CPA attack algorithm. We construct an 
algorithm B against HNFR LWE

++− that runs as follows, given oracle O that 
samples from either ( )
qi iq
U R R

 or ,i isA 

for some previously chosen i is  and 
ii 
   .Algorithm B first calls O to get a sample ((hi)', (Ci)') from qi iqR R

 . 
Then, algorithm B runs A with public key ( ) ( ).( ) '
ii i i q
h p h R=  . When A outputs 
challenge messages
10( , () )iiM M P , algorithm B picks ({0,1})b U , computes 
the challenge ciphertext ( ) ( ).( ) ' ( )
qii i i bi
C p C M R= +  , and returns (Ci) to A. 
Eventually, when A outputs its guess b' for b, algorithm B outputs 1 if b' = b and 
0 otherwise. The (hi)' used by B is uniformly random in
iq
R

and therefore so is 
the public key (hi) given to A, thanks to the invertibility of (pi) modulo (qi). Thus, 
by Theorem 3 in [14], the public key given to A is within statistical distance 
( )n
q
−
of the public key distribution in the genuine attack, component-wise. 
Moreover, since ( ) ' ( ).i i i iC h s e= + with ,i i is e  , the ciphertext (Ci) given to A 
has the right distribution as in the IND-CPA attack. Overall, if O outputs 
samples from ,i isA 

then A succeeds and B returns 1 with probability
( )
(1 / 2,1 / 2,1 / 2,1 / 2)
n
i iq
−
 + − . Now, if O outputs samples from ( )
qi iq
U R R

 , 
then, since 
ii q
p R

 , the value of (pi)(Ci)' and hence (Ci), is uniformly random in 
Rqi and independent of b. It follows that B outputs 1 with probability 1/2, 
component-wise. The claimed advantage of B follows.                                                □ 
A New Provably Secure Cryptosystem Using Dedekind Domain Direct 
Product Approach 
 
 
63 
 
 
By combining lemmata 3 and 4 (with adaptation of Theorem 1 in [14]) we 
obtain main result. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we provided a new cryptosystem that uses the properties of the ETRU 
cryptosystem and its structured lattice to achieve high efficiency by providing a 
provable security (CPA-secure) based on ideal lattices and a variant of R-LWE 
problem. Also we showed that each polynomial in 
1
3 3
( [ ] [ ])[ ]/ (1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1) ... (1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1)
n n
R x x x x 
−
=   + + + + Z Z  has its 
coefficients of the form 
3 3
(( , ), ( , ))
i i i i
a b c dz z  where , , ,
i i iia b c d Z , so we made both 
lemmata and theorems here for ai's, bi's, ci's and di's separately, that is, we reflected 
2 2
( , ) ( , )@C C R R . Hence, we could enhance the dimension of lattice 4-times without 
increasing n.  
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